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 Reflexivity is actually a key term in the 
dramatic and rapid changes confronted by the 
human sciences (especially sociology) during 
the last four decades and “yet the word is used 
in so many different senses that it often sustains 
confusion rather than clarifying any underlying 
issues” (Holland, 1999: 463).
 In general, reflexivity was comprehen-
sively defined by George Herbert Mead as “the 
turning back of the experience of the individual 
upon [her- or himself]” (Mead, 1934: 134) and by 
Sara Delamont as “a social scientific variety of 
self-consciousness” (Delamont, 1991: 8). It still 
constitutes a rather ubiquitous sociological and 
epistemological problem.
 Methodological reflexivity (also known 
as “epistemological circularity”), as a systematic 
means to deeper and better understand the com-
plex “knowledge-making enterprise, including 
a consideration of the subjective, institutional, 
social, and political processes whereby research 
is conducted and knowledge is produced” 
(Alvesson, 2007), has been rendered one of the 
most attractive sociological/epistemological buz-
zwords of our time, especially after the advent of 
post-modern theory.
 In particular, the radical reflexive aware-
ness of the mutual dependency of sociological 
categories (e. g. risk, citizenship, space, time, 
modernity, morality) and social practice has 
been increasingly brought right at the forefront 
of hot academic/epistemological debates.1
1 For Wanda Pillow, we should fruitfully prioritize “reflex-
ivity” as a specific topic of sociological study in its own 
right – in contrast to the very fact that it is regularly used 
by most researchers “without defining how they are us-
ing it, as if it is something we all commonly understand 
and accept as standard methodological practice for criti-
cal qualitative research” (Pillow, 2003: 176).
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 The radical anti-objectivistic (value-load-
ed) conception of reflexivity entails that the cus-
tomary sociological endeavor to systematically 
“position” individuals and various social or cultur-
al groups and elites in terms of locus of control 
and power, or to methodologically “explicate” so-
cial or cultural representations of human rights, 
duties, justice, equality, democracy, security or 
terrorism, is de facto both politically and person-
ally relevant.
 The social scientific researcher (the so-
cial psychologist, the social historian, the cultural 
anthropologist, the social or political analyst), as 
a historically located social agent, should always 
“state his/her attitude to the subject under dis-
cussion to let the readers know of the alternative 
position as well as to facilitate their better under-
standing of the situation” so that “it is no longer 
possible for the scientist to assume the classical 
so-called God’s eye view” (Dobronravova, 2009: 
25).
 In the contemporary academic context, 
it is almost customary to variously describe so-
ciological theories as both constitutive of and 
constitutive for practice, but also to tactically (or 
“cynically”, as the French critical sociologist and 
philosopher Pierre Bourdieu smartly puts it) use 
“reflexivity” in order to criticize or polemize oth-
ers: “As the charge was once made of being a 
positivist, to be called an unreflexive practitioner 
seems to signify someone who is inadequate, in-
complete and worst of all, outdated” (May, 1999: 
para 1.1).2
2. Reflexivity and the Self
 Reflexivity also involves the inspiring nov-
el conception of “internal conversation” (Archer, 
2003) that theoretically describes the continuous 
self-confrontation of the individual, as well as its 
complex dialogical interaction with the (changing) 
social environment. It is therefore “the regular ex-
2 As Mark Hobart puts it, “one person’s claim to knowl-
edge is all too often another’s condemnation to igno-
rance” (Hobart, 1995: 51). In consequence, reflexiv-
ity is paradoxically transformed into an unethical egois-
tic project of simply becoming the “certified deconstruc-
tors” (Jackson, 1992) of other people’s discourse and a 
“dead end rather than a route to more thoughtful and in-
teresting social studies” (Alvesson, 2007). This should 
lead us to further elaborate on the agonistic notion of “re-
flexive sociology” or, more precisely, on the antagonistic 
relationship between reflexive sociology and the sociol-
ogy of reflexivity (Kenway and McLeod, 2004), between 
truly “reflexive accounts” and mere “accounts of reflex-
ivity” (Mauthner and Doucet, 2003). In fact, reflexivity is 
a contingent chance rather than a “sacred cow”, a fixed 
or “black-boxed” model providing strong, irrefutable and 
eternal methodological guarantees (see Garratt, 2003).
ercise of the mental ability, shared by all normal 
people, to consider themselves in relation to their 
(social) contexts and vice versa” (Archer, 2007: 
4). The sociological theorization of this “complex 
dialogical interaction” heavily draws from the fa-
mous school of American Pragmatism (mainly 
grounded on the original stimulating insights of 
John Dewey, William James, Charles Sanders 
Peirce and George Herbert Mead).3 
 From a relational social epistemological 
analytic standpoint, the self (including the epis-
temological/philosophical or sociological self) is 
rather reflexively re-created; it is necessarily in-
tertwined with the “real world” and dialectically 
re-constituted by the on-going, mutual, synerget-
ic and (chaotic) self-organizing interaction of the 
ego (1) with the emergent social structures and 
(2) with the significant others (actual, imagined, 
or implied).4 The very existence (or appearance) 
of these “significant others” is completely inte-
gral to the evolutionary reflexive emergence of 
selfhood. Yet, in the original social interpretivist 
sense of George Herbert Mead, the “other” is not 
only the other (significant) person, “but another 
perspective: another way in which the world is 
judged or appreciated” (Natanson 1956: 64).
The self thus appears neither as a mere “ob-
ject” of knowledge, nor as an empirical ego, which 
somehow lacks autonomy, agency, imagination, 
choice, creativity, improvisation and spontaneity. 
In other words, the human subject is not passive, 
self-assured, atomistic, and narcissistically pri-
vate any more (see e.g. Tsivacou, 2005; Cilliers 
3 According to Margaret Archer, “only if the ‘internal con-
versation’ can be upheld as an irreducible personal prop-
erty, which is real and causally influential, can the exer-
cise of its powers be considered as the missing media-
tory mechanism that is needed to complete an adequate 
account of social conditioning” (Archer, 2003: 16).
4 In parallel, what should also be reflexively recognized is 
the particular importance of the “I-thou” relationship (Bu-
ber, 1970), which was the very essence of the great So-
cratic dialogues. This complex relationship has been in-
volved with the original introduction of second-person in-
ter-subjective methodologies, such as Bohmian dialogue, 
leading to innovative forms of “dialogic consciousness” 
(Bohm, 1985).
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and De Villiers, 2000; Briggs and Peat, 1999).5 
The self-in-relation-with-others (methodological 
relationalism) is now clearly prevailing upon the 
old self-in-social-vacuum (methodological individ-
ualism) (Ho et al., 2001).
 Instead of naively seeing subjectivity 
as an isolated, independent, self-contained and 
self-referred locus of individual experience (ac-
cording to the classical Cartesian ego), the syn-
thetic reflexive-relational logic, in the open spirit 
of Ludwig Binswanger (1963), fruitfully links it 
with objectivity and inter-subjectivity, through an 
(endless) uncertain circular-dialectical process, 
without however reducing ontological questions 
to epistemological ones (just as Kant did), or 
“facts” to performative descriptions and inter-
pretations, symbolic categories and conceptual 
frameworks.
 Within a relational-realist or reflexive-
realist6 analytic framework, knowledge cannot 
and should not be erroneously confounded with 
the “recording and analysis of the ‘pre-notions’ 
(in Durkheim’s sense) that social agents engage 
in the construction of social reality; it must also 
encompass the social conditions of the produc-
tion of these pre-constructions and of the social 
agents who produce them” (Bourdieu, 2003: 
282).7
5 Of course, it is almost a commonplace nowadays that 
the self is relational. In addition, it is almost a truism that 
knowledge cannot be analytically distinguished from its 
multiple complex cognitive-political practices, as well as 
from the multiple complex social relations that make it 
generally acceptable and legitimate. However, many of 
the so-called “situated” or “contextual” perspectives “still 
treat the environment as supplemental to the individu-
al consciousness” and the “concept of autonomous indi-
vidual mind – learning to participate – remains privileged 
and fundamentally unchallenged” (Fenwick, 2001: 247). 
This implicitly reflects the continuing determination of so-
cial/sociological theory to be strong, on the varied ba-
sis of final analytic judgments, robust results, compelling 
arguments and inescapably powerful conclusions (Pels, 
2003). It is remarkable that hardly anyone in everyday 
performative practice actually sees knowledge as inher-
ently circular! See e.g. Pels, 2002 and Woolgar, 1988.
6 For the notion of reflexive or circular realism, see Pels, 
2000b.
7 Of course, this should carefully refrain from any sort of 
“last-instance” objectivism and decisively move towards 
a rather never-ending reflexive dialectic between micro 
and macro, action and structure, transformation and re-
production, individuality and sociality (or individual and 
collective action), randomness and simplicity, contingen-
cy and directionality, emergence and social causation 
(Sawyer, 2007), as well as towards a generalized critique 
of naïve/uncritical/unreflexive realism, reification and es-
sentialism, at the level of both everyday world-making 
and professional scientific (sociological/organizational) 
analysis.
 This is of course in line with Roy Bhas-
kar’s or Pierre Bourdieu’s stance of critical/rela-
tional realism, but not with Anthony Giddens’s 
ultra-activistic structuration theory, or with Berg-
er/Luckmann’s subjectivistic accounts of social 
constructivism, which implicitly reproduce and 
naively celebrate the old tradition of phenom-
enological individualism.
3. Reflexivity and Spokespersonship
 But, in the analytic context of a truly re-
flexive theory, the eye of the “observer” (Luh-
mann, 1995; Maturana and Varela, 1987; Tsi-
vacou, 2005; Dobronravova, 2009) is always 
there. The very fact that these “social conditions” 
(or the “generative mechanisms”) are only ob-
servable through their consequences raises the 
reflexive problem of their representation. That 
is, how do we know that invisible conditions, 
mechanisms, figurations or structures really ex-
ist? Who speaks for them (or in their name)? And 
who has accorded the essential primacy of the 
invisible (unobservable) over the visible (observ-
able)?
 Such self-critical questions about the rep-
resentation (delegation) of “noumenal” or “transfac-
tual” entities, as well as about the crucial performa-
tive role of their (intellectual) “spokespersons”,8 
potentially give us valuable access to a genu-
ine reflexive (meta-reflexive) sociology of so-
ciologists, intellectuals and experts (see Pels, 
2000a).
 Interrogating the intriguing phenomenon 
of “spokespersonship” itself, in particular, implies 
a whole reflexive knowledge-political project of 
carefully bringing the observer back into her/his 
observation, the narrator back into her/his narra-
tive, or the scenographer back into her/his scene 
(Gouldner, 1985), as well as of taking seriously 
into account the complex “crucial role of the de-
finer” (Alpert, 1961: 114), which is in direct con-
trast to “traditional” or “received” positivistic ten-
dencies to hypostasize social reality and to reify 
(or to blackbox) supposedly impersonal “social 
facts” (Durkheim, 1982).
8 Spokespersonship involves the ubiquitous, communi-
cation-dependent representational work of publicly per-
forming, evoking, or making visible and available that 
which is absent and therefore falls outside the horizon 
of immediate control, which is not able to speak for it-
self (people, animals, things, facts, mechanisms, or rela-
tions). This is, by definition, a “vitally constitutive element 
of all cultural life, since collectivities cannot subsist and 
expand other than by mobilizing absent realities, events 
or processes … in networks of interaction that stretch 
into distant reaches of time and space” (Pels, 2000a: 1).
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 Against any implicit form of epistemologi-
cal realism or essentialism, according to which 
social structures, systems, figurations or fields 
are authoritatively described as “objectively” fac-
tual, self-contained and autonomous entities (and 
not as emergent theoretical constructions pro-
posed by the sociological observer), the anti-
reificatory notion of “spokespersonship” strongly 
refuses to uphold any sharp and static distinction, 
or any privileged distance, between representation 
and reality, between words and the very “flesh of 
the world” (Merleau-Ponty, 1962).
 Instead, it rather tends to conceive of so-
cial objects primarily as meaningful, complex and 
dynamic virtual realities, which are incessantly 
and unpredictably realized and de-realized, insti-
tuted and de-instituted, through contextual and 
situated definitions and performances, both on 
the level of routine everyday action and on the 
second-order level of professional sociological 
observation and analysis (see Pels, 2003).
 The complex projective relationship be-
tween the spokesperson and that which is spo-
ken for has been highly problematized and over-
whelmingly characterized as both performative 
and circular (see Tsekeris and Katerelos, 2007):
1. On the one hand, the silent performative 
effectiveness of scientific or political statements 
derives “naturally” from the relative “capacity of 
spokespersons or ‘authorities’ to enforce collec-
tive recognition and hence to realize their rep-
resentations with the aid of an accredited and 
therefore credible language” (Pels, 2002: 77). 
Any scholarly description of society can eventu-
ally “produce significant changes within society 
once this description reaches a certain level of 
acceptance. To have any influence on the practi-
cal job of modifying self-descriptions, theories 
must be able to gain recognition and circulation 
outside narrow intellectual circles. Then it be-
comes a description of society within society, and 
thereby changes society (the names of Marx, 
Kant and Freud may suffice to prove this point)” 
(Laermans and Verschraegen, 1998: 128). This 
ultimately calls for the explicit celebration of the 
so-called “theory effect” of the sociological dis-
cursive construction of reality (Bourdieu, 1991), 
which is often underestimated and erased (or 
just methodologically neutralized).9
2. On the other hand, a critical theory of 
spokespersonship needs to openly acknowl-
edge the complex “intricate circular transmission 
of legitimacy and power from the group to its rep-
resenter, in the course of which the group appar-
ently creates the person who speaks in its place 
…, whereas in reality it is just as true to say that 
it is the spokesperson who creates the group” 
(Pels, 2000a: 8). The essential complex circular-
ity of connection between the signifier and the 
signified, the representer and the represented, 
does not, however, exclude a minimal critical dif-
ference or hiatus (or tension) between them, in 
order to actually preserve the vital interactional 
space in which both laypersons (citizens) and 
professional politicians or experts are able to mu-
tually and synergistically play their distinctive 
parts (see Ankersmit, 1994).
 In the daily life-worldly context of their 
various collective experiments and research 
findings, working scientists continuously and 
creatively add up new spokespersons repre-
senting non-humans and their needs (e.g. the 
Gulf Stream, which allegedly threatens to dis-
appear due to multiple changes in the salinity of 
the Atlantic Ocean) to “the many spokespersons 
9 Performativity is generally defined as a useful mode of 
theorizing and practicing the multiple ways in which so-
cial reality comes into being. It lies in the widely accepted 
(post-structuralist) linguistic emphasis on meaning and 
the well-known “social constructionist” premise that ac-
quiring knowledge (or truth) does not involve an accurate 
mimetic reflection (re-presentation) of the world, but is 
associated with a relationally embedded human activity, 
which substantially alters the contingent and fragile “na-
ture” of reality itself. Knowledge is subsequently the un-
certain (and unpredictable) product of the individual’s re-
lationships, in communication with others in the fluid and 
precariously negotiated world. As ethnomethodologists 
might simply put it, to describe a situation is to constitute 
it. Therefore, all social scientific statements, propositions 
and theories are performative, in the clear-cut sense that 
they have effects, they do things, and they make differ-
ences. Accordingly, for John Law and John Urry (2004), 
research methods in the social sciences do not simply de-
scribe or explain the world as it is, but also contingently 
enact it, in a wide range of locations. They actually help 
to bring into being what they also discover and they co-
produce the objects they are supposed to objectively an-
alyze. That is, the making of what we know in-here goes 
hand in hand with the making of what there is out-there. 
The idea of performative reality-making, partially inspired 
by Austinian speech act theory, the Thomas/Merton the-
orem of the self-fulfilling prophecy, dramaturgical meta-
phors (Goffman, Searle, Turner, Schechner, and Schief-
felin) and the poststructuralist inseparability of factu-
al and value judgments in performative speech, strong-
ly emphasizes the communicative powers of social re-
search and the “natural” involvement of an “audience” 
(e.g., peers, students, readers, a physical audience or a 
cyber audience).
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who already represent humans and their needs 
…Who would have anticipated that human prog-
ress would have become so all-embracing?” 
(Latour, 1998: 209). This profoundly signifies a 
durable, heterogeneous and complex society of 
both humans and non-humans.
 A critical theory of spokespersonship 
should thus aim to fruitfully identify us as re-
flexive authors, who self-consciously take ethi-
cal responsibility for what we (playfully) enact. 
Such a theory rather favours an alternative, non-
ascetic social epistemological approach, which 
self-confidently stands against all purist macho 
aspirations to Platonic perfectionism, intellectual 
ventriloquism, and priestly hypocrisy (Nietzsche, 
1996; Bourdieu, 1991).
 The issue here involves a novel social-
epistemological sense of performative sensitivi-
ty, complex relationality, intellectual courage and 
democratic imagination, as well as an incessant 
radical critique of the hegemonic power over 
representation, so as to allow the represented “to 
talk back and to include an ever wider constitu-
ency in our audience which is counterfactually 
identical with the universal audience (the dead in-
cluded)” (Vandenberghe, 2002: 63).
 From a relational-realist, or reflexive-re-
alist, analytic viewpoint, the radical constructiv-
ists (a la Woolgar) should nevertheless abandon 
their extreme ontological nihilism10 and make only 
methodological use of such notions as relativ-
ism, constructivism, performativity, and reflexivity/
spokespersonship (without however ending up 
to any kind of methodological foundationalism).
 This will eventually show us “how ‘real-
ity’ – that is, the descriptions, re-descriptions, 
and constructions of reality, but not reality itself, 
of course, which exists independently of those de-
scriptions in the same way as the dog barks 
whether we have a concept of it or not – is ‘per-
formatively’ constructed as a matter of course by 
their spokespersons. Such a move from onto-
logical to methodological nominalism implies a 
10 The highly heterogeneous nexus of post-structuralism, 
post-modernism, deconstruction, psychoanalysis, fem-
inism, gender and queer studies, archeology/genealogy 
and other de-constructivist approaches, such as Rorty´s 
neo-pragmatism, usually does not recognize anything 
“outside of the text” (Derrida) and has more or less tend-
ed to impede or delete the critical impetus of hermeneu-
tics. It often commits the so-called “linguistic fallacy”, 
or the “reification of language”, which naively reduces 
the world to language (just as Rorty did), social action 
to “performance”, and the human subject to an unsta-
ble patchwork of signifiers (the case of Baudrillard) or to 
an endless chain discursive identifications, and has un-
avoidably led to a serious underestimation of the causal 
power of language.
consequent switch from a ‘deconstructivist’ to a 
genuinely ‘constructivist’ posture, from construc-
tion to something more akin to phenomenologi-
cal constitution” (Vandenberghe, 1999: 35, n. 7).
4. The Apophatic Dimension of Reflexivity
 Furthermore, it is quite remarkable that 
various forms of reflexivity are paradoxically at-
tracted to the old Cartesian ideals of mentalism, 
authoritarian individualism, elitism and context-
transcendent (yet racialized) knowledge (see 
Tsekeris and Katrivesis, 2008). However, genu-
ine reflexive thinking is significantly compatible 
to novel sociological/philosophical approaches 
beyond old occidentalist/eurocentric agendas, 
as well as to the creative quest for spirituality 
(see e.g. Briggs and Peat, 1999).
 Apophatic reflexivity, a term coined within 
social/sociological theory by the leading Greek 
sociologist and prolific writer Nicos Mouzelis 
(1999),11 signifies a wholly different (non-euro-
centric/non-occidentalist), less rational and more 
spiritual way of theorizing the fluid processes of 
self-awareness, self-experience and self-identi-
ty, within the current “liquid” framework of post-
modernity.
 It more generally refers to possible ways 
in which spirituality can substantially contribute 
to current academic debates regarding the com-
plex internal conversations of the social subject, 
as well as regarding the emerging shift toward 
post-secular and post-materialist codes and val-
ues.
 The innovative concept of apophatic re-
flexivity is explicitly opposed to Anthony Giddens’s 
well-established theory of reflexive modernization 
(see Giddens, 1991), at the level of the social 
individual. In particular, Mouzelis argues that Gid-
dens’s notion of (individual) reflexivity is both 
eurocentric (or “western-centric”) and “over-
activistic” (or “cataphatic”), inevitably leading to 
an excessive analytic emphasis upon a highly 
ordering, instrumental, and chronically monitor-
ing approach to the inherently varied, complex 
and dynamic process of self-definition and self-
identity (see Mouzelis, 1999: 85-86).
 Hence, apophatic reflexivity can be deemed 
as an elaborate and systematic way to compre-
hensively challenge and extend “received” or 
“conventional” conceptions of reflexivity, as well 
11 For Nicos Mouzelis’s most recent account on the utili-
ty of the apophatic/cataphatic distinction in the sociolog-
ical/social theoretical study of self–self (intra-active) and 
self–other (interactive) forms of reflexivity, see Mouzelis, 
2010.
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as to perceptively escape from severe limitations 
on the possible modes of individual reflexive re-
sponses to contemporary post-traditional and post-
modern settings.
 Mouzelis sharply criticizes Giddens’s the-
oretical framework, where knowledgeable social 
actors are more or less depicted as constantly 
involved in coldly cognitive “means-ends situa-
tions, constantly trying reflexively and rationally to 
choose their broad goals as well as the means of 
their realisation”, exactly because it naively ne-
glects “more contemplative, more ‘easy-going’, 
less cognitive ways of navigating reflexively in a 
world full of choices and individual challenges” 
(Mouzelis, 1999: 85).
 Apophatic reflexivity is thus focusing on 
the increasing (existentialist) importance of “the 
inner life”, or the increasing necessity to create 
one’s own goals (or to construct one’s own bi-
ography) through the on-going silent negation 
(apophasis) of the various internal obstacles to 
the genuine “search for a spiritual, meaningful 
existence” (Mouzelis, 1999: 88).
 This radical approach freely allows for broad 
life orientations, projects, agendas and goals to 
spontaneously emerge, rather than being strictly 
dictated by “Promethean” planning, coldly cog-
nitive factors, rational calculations, “divine revela-
tions, sacred texts, as well as rationalistically 
derived moral codes” (Mouzelis, 1999: 88).
 In this original analytic context, apophat-
ic reflexivity comes up in the very same line with 
the apophatic theology (or “theology by way of 
negation”) of the eastern Orthodox church, where 
the believer turns inward in order to eliminate 
obscuring thoughts and/or practices, as well as 
with the Freudian psychoanalytic tradition, where 
the central aim of analysis is “not to impose on 
or offer the analysand pre-set goals, but rather to 
‘negatively’ eliminate or weaken various defen-
sive mechanisms that are obstructing the emer-
gence of a person’s ‘genuine’ goals” (Mouzelis, 
2007: para 2.10).12
 Apophatic reflexivity is also in the very 
same vein with spiritual traditions, such as the 
philosophical sociology/anthropology of Mar-
tin Buber (1970) and the philosophy of the re-
nowned anti-religious writer and speaker Jiddu 
Krishnamurti, who repeatedly argued that “the 
12 In a different analytic framework, Nicos Mouzelis sup-
ports the (weak) “apophatic” character of technology (par-
ticularly manifested in contemporary environmental recy-
cling and anti-pollution technologies), which is profound-
ly linked to the modest and humble goals of restoring 
natural balances and harmonies, as well as to the Self-
Nature relationship, against the Western classical power 
discourse (Mouzelis, 1997).
fundamental understanding of oneself does not 
come through knowledge or through the cultiva-
tion of experiences” (Krishnamurti, 1970: 25).
 For Krishnamurti, indeed, an “authentic” 
existence implies self-exploration, self-aware-
ness and self-development through “silent and 
continuous gazing inwards” (Mouzelis, 1999: 89), 
as well as a “tranquility that is not a product of the 
mind, a tranquility that is neither imagined nor cul-
tivated” (Krishnamurti, 1970: 28).
Such an extended “post-colonial” and “post-sec-
ular” conception of reflexivity potentially offers 
not only a creative and dynamic widening of self-
identity and the communication with the self, but 
also a provocative global redefinition of the very 
human experience given that “being human in-
volves feeling, dreaming, experiencing, remem-
bering and forgetting, and not simply knowing” 
(Halton, 1995: 273).
 Nevertheless, alternative interdisciplin-
ary arguments, views and discourses “may fur-
ther illustrate and problematize the one-sided-
ness of neo-liberal accounts of the reflexive self” 
(Adams, 2002), since apophatic reflexivity does 
not actually “attempt to do justice to the entirety 
of critical points levelled at the term. In pursuing 
these alternatives, a more complex and repre-
sentative understanding of reflexivity and self-
identity may be generated” (Adams, 2007: 60).
5. Final Thoughts and Considerations
 What perhaps remains to be carefully ex-
plored and elaborated here is the possible circu-
lar-reflexive application of apophatic reflexivity 
on the epistemic subject itself, toward a genu-
ine apophatic reflexive sociology (Tsekeris and 
Lydaki, 2007),13 as well as its wider normative/
ethical connotations. Our analytic attention must 
then turn into the much neglected (and unre-
stored) significance of normative/ethical issues, 
from a fertile interdisciplinary/transdisciplinary the-
oretical viewpoint.
 Normative notions of reflexive agency and 
ethical responsibility do remain extremely impor-
tant, but they have to be adequately supplement-
ed with fresh insights from emerging theories 
of social complexity, (chaotic) self-organization 
and social construction (Cilliers and De Villiers, 
2000). There are of course many unresolved (or 
unaddressed) issues in this huge area and some 
13 Reflexivity must therefore be introverted and extrovert-
ed at the same time. For the relevant notion of “structural 
self-reflexivity” (somehow similar to the Bourdieusian in-
tellectual socioanalysis, or “self-socioanalysis”), see the 
superb analysis of Hans Herbert Koegler (1997).
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very exciting intellectual work could be collabor-
atively done here.
 Embracing the relational “normative dimen-
sion”, within the sociological reflexivity discourse, 
could perhaps help us in seeing ourselves “with 
the eyes of the other” (Heinz von Foerster), as 
well as in moving beyond the Enlightenment need 
for grand intellectual heroes, or compassionate 
social engineers (designing unflawed systems), 
and the utopian/narcissistic modernist dreams 
(delusions) of unlimited theoretical wisdom and 
epistemological perfection – without however de-
valuing science or eschewing issues of value, 
justice, politics and accountability.
 It could also help us to radically expand 
the famous “it could be otherwise” liberal-progres-
sive vision (Charles W. Mills) of social thought, 
as well as to see “beyond the end of our noses” 
and seriously/responsibly assess the likelihood 
of (local) social change and emancipatory so-
cial scenarios, under the multiple restrains of the 
post-modern framework. In the very spiritual con-
text of a new reflexive “sociological imagination” 
(Charles W. Mills), social theory can be openly 
re-transformed into a form of universal historical 
self-consciousness. Actually, this ideal is not dead 
yet!
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Refleksije o refleksivnosti: Sociološka pitanja i perspektive
CHARALAMBOS TSEKERIS
Panteion Sveučilište društvenih i političkih znanosti, Grčka
Cilj ovog rada je temeljito se usredotočiti i kritički se suočiti s teorijs-
kom i metodološkom koncepcijom sociološke refleksivnosti. Članak potom 
daje pregled relevantnih rasprava o sociološkim i metodološkim definici-
jama refleksivnosti, kao i o kompleksnom odnosu prema pojmovima sebe 
i glasnogovorništva. Konceptualna elaboracija obaju pojmova naglašava 
ključnu važnost relacijske dimenzije nad rizicima i opasnostima subjektiviz-
ma/objektivizma, reifikacije (blackboxing) i esencijalizma. Također, posebna 
važnost dana je apofatičkoj dimenziji refleksivnosti, naspram eurocentrične 
(vestocentrične) i preaktivističke (ili katafatičke) dimenzije koja neizbježno 
vodu u pretjerano analitički naglasak na čvrstom uređenju, instrumental-
iziranom i vremenski praćenom pristupu inherentno dinamičnim i fluidnim 
procesima samosvijesti, samoiskustva, samopoimanja i samoidentificiranja. 
Ključne riječi: refleksivnost, znanje, sociologija, epistemologija, metodologija, 
društvena teorija, glasnogovorništvo
